





Papineau’s Conceptual Dualism 
and the Distinctness Intuition
Abstract
As part of a defense of a physicalist view of experiences, David Papineau (2002) has offered 
an explanation for the intuition that properties found in experiences are distinct from neural 
properties. After providing some necessary background, I argue that Papineau’s explanati-
on is not the best explanation of the distinctness intuition. An alternative explanation that 
is compatible with dualism is offered. Unlike Papineau’s explanation, this alternative does 
not require us to suppose that the distinctness intuition rests on fallacious reasoning. Rela-
















































not	 examples	of	 introspection.	They	are	 states	 in	which	 it	 is	 seeing	 red	or	
hearing	a	certain	kind	of	sound	 that	 is	conscious.	 In	contrast,	 introspective	
knowledge	would	be,	for	example,	knowledge	that	one	is	consciously	seeing	
red	or	consciously	hearing	a	certain	kind	of	sound.
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I	 have	 discussed	 what	 Wittgenstein	 (1953)	
































(A)	 Interactionism	 answers,	 “Yes”.	 When,	 for	 example,	 people	 report	 the	
color	of	what	they	see,	they	have	a	conscious	event	of,	say,	the	red	kind,	and	
it	is	in	virtue	of	this	property	that	the	conscious	event	causes	neural	events	
that,	eventually,	 lead	 to	contractions	of	muscles	 in	 the	vocal	apparatus	 that	






in	neurons	–	motions	of	 neurotransmitter	molecules,	 or	 of	 ions	 across	 cell	
membranes,	or	some	such	events	–	are	caused	by	instantiations	of	nonphy-
sical	properties.	This	 implies	 that,	even	in	a	fully	developed	science	of	 the	
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difference	 between	 the	 visual	 experience	you	 have	 when	 looking	 at	 a	 ripe	
strawberry	and	the	visual	experience	you	have	when	looking	at	a	leaf	in	sum-




























































To	 this	 end,	 let	 us	 consider	 an	 example	 of	 an	 ordinary	 thing	 that	 has	 two	
distinctive	 properties;	 namely,	 a	 harp,	 which	 has	 a	 distinctive	 sound	 when	
plucked	 and	 a	 distinctive	 shape.	The	 shape	 property	 and	 the	 characteristic	
timbre	property	are	properties	of	the	same	individual	thing.	They	are,	how-
ever,	two	properties.	As	we	enter	the	discussion	of	Papineau’s	view,	we	must	
be	clear	 that	 the	 identity	he	 is	claiming	 is	not	 this	weak	sort	of	“identity”,	
which	is	merely	the	identity	of	the	possessor	of	two	distinct	properties.	He	
is	saying	that	the	experiential	property,	seeing red	is	the	same	property	as	a	








causal	 roles.	Pain	 is	 a	 leading	 example:	 pain	 is	 commonly	 supposed	 to	be	
what	causes	pain	behavior,	 such	as	withdrawal	or	protection	of	a	damaged	


























































caused	 by	 ripe	 strawberries	 in	 normal	 conditions	 would,	 on	 this	 usage,	 be	
phenomenally	 red;	 the	 strawberries	 themselves	would	be	 red,	 but	not	phe-
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does	 not	 imply	 that	 the	 distinctness	 intuition	 rests	 on	 a	 fallacy;	 and,	 other	
things	being	equal,	explanations	that	preserve	attributions	of	cognitive	cor-
rectness	 are	 to	be	preferred	 to	 those	 that	 imply	cognitive	 impropriety.	The	






experiences	 that	we	are	held	 to	 refer	 to	when	we	deploy	phenomenal	con-
cepts.	These	neural	properties,	on	my	view,	are	the	same	as	the	neural	prop-
erties	of	events	that	cause	our	experiences	and	their	properties.	So,	there	is	
no	 difference	 between	 Papineau’s	 conception	 of	 relevant	 neural	 properties	
and	mine.	Papineau	raises	a	number	of	difficulties	for	the	project	of	actually	





























in	 this	 line	of	 thought:	appearing	 in	some	way	is	appearing	 to	exemplify	a	




















(R6)	 A	non-identity	view	can	coherently	account	 for	 the	difference	 identi-
fied	by	(R1)	and	(R2)	by	saying	that	the	property	involved	in	uses	of	
































	 	 	 (a)	an	imagined	experience	of	type	G























to	 have	 a	 kind	 of	 simplicity,	 it	 is	 less	 evident	 that	 the	 difference	 between	
representing	red	and	representing	green	has	that	same	kind	of	simplicity.	For	
suppose	there	is	a	brain	event	in	a	normally	sighted	person	that	systematically	



























for	example,	 they	must	be	available	 to	a	cognitive	 system	 that	can	 lead	 to	





















































































Some	 alternative	 accounts	 can	 be	 found	 in	
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William S. Robinson
Papineaus konzeptualer Dualismus 
und die Intuition der Gewissheit
Zusammenfassung
Im Rahmen seiner Verteidigung der physikalistischen Sichtweise der Erfahrung bot David Pa-
pineau 2002 die Erklärung an, dass bei der Intuition die erfahrungsmäßigen Eigenschaften 
anders geartet seien als neuronale Eigenschaften. Nach einer Schilderung des notwendigen 
Kontextes vertritt der Autor die These, dass Papineaus Erklärung zur Intuition der Gewissheit 
nicht die beste sei. Angeboten wird eine alternative, mit dem Dualismus kompatible Erklärung. 
Im Unterschied zu Papineaus Standpunkt setzt diese Alternative nicht die Annahme voraus, 
dass die Intuition der Gewissheit auf trugschlüssigen Gedankengängen beruhe. Es wird das 
Verhältnis der angeführten alternativen Sichtweise zum Repräsentationalismus sowie zu Fällen 





Le dualisme conceptuel et l’intuition de la 
distinction chez David Papineau
Résumé
Défendant le point de vue physicaliste de l’expérience, David Papineau (2002) propose une 
explication à l’intuition que les propriétés contenues dans les expériences se distinguent des 
propriétés nerveuses. Après avoir présenté quelques éléments de contexte, je soutiens que 
l’hypothèse de Papineau n’est pas la meilleure pour expliquer l’intuition de la distinction. Il 
existe une explication alternative, compatible avec le dualisme. A la différence de celle de Papi-
neau, cette explication ne demande pas de supposer que l’intuition de la distinction soit fondée 
sur un raisonnement fallacieux. Le débat porte sur les rapports de cette explication alternative 
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